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INTTRODU4T i.bK.
The principles which underlie and form the basis of the
whole doctrine of imputed negligence are plain and simple.
But upon investigating the subject, we are at once brought
face to face with a great conflict of opinion in regard to
its application.

The great difficulty and perplexing ques-

tions that are constantly presenting themselves, and upon whic4
the courts differ, spring not, as a rule, from a lack of
knowledge of the underlying p'ineiples: but rather from the
difficulty met with in their application to the particular
questions in hand.
Before entering into a discussion of the subject it will
be of advantage to ask and answer the following questions:
I.

What legal relation must exist between the plaintiff

and- the third, person in order that the contributory negligence
of that person may be legally imputed to the plaintiff to bar
his recovery for injuries suffered through the negligence of
the defendet?
2. What imist be shown in

order to have the contributory

negligence of the third person serve as a defense to an action

fora negligent injury to the plaintiff?
Now first as to the legal relation.

There must be

such a privity of relation as exists in law between master
and servant and principal and agent.

Or in other words, the

one whom it is sought to impute with negligence must stand in
sueh a relation of privity to the third person that the maxim
qui facit per aliur facit per se is directly applicable.'

If

such relation does not exist there ought not to be any imputation of negligence.
In answer to our second inquiry, it must be made to appear:(1l) that the third person was guilty of negligence;
('2) that such negligenee was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's

injury; (

) that the plaintiff ought to be charged

with such negligence as though it had been his own.

These

are the three necessary elements to constitute a defense of
imputable contributory negligence,

and if

any one be lacking

the defense cannot stand.
The purpose of this paper is to investigate somewhat in
detai% the law of a few specific jurisdictions, and in a more
general way the law as it exists throughout the United States
and Ehgland.

There being different phases of the question

we will eonsider ther in the following order:
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Unattended.

The first or parent case in-

voing the doctrine of imputing the contributory negligence
of a parent to an infant to prevent his recovery for an injury causes by the alleged negligence of the defendent, was
thattof Hartfield v Roper, decided in 1899 and reported in
-21 Wend. 615.

The report shows that an infant of two hears

had gone into the public street and while sitting there in
the snow was run over by defendn t's team. .The

question

presented was whether the plaintiff aught to have0been nonsuited in the court below.
Chief Justice Cowen was not content to-docide the case
by showing that the evidence revealed no negligence on the
part of the defendant, but went on and discussed the effect
of the parent"s negligence on the right of tbe- infant to recover.

After deciding that the parents were negligent from

the mere fact that the child was found in such a place, the
learned Judge, to, support his conalus- on that their negligence
would -prevent a recovery by the infant; argued that an infant
of that age was not sui juris and that as the protection of
his person was exclusively confided to the parent, the parent

thereby became an agent for that purpose,

and hence any neg-

ligence on his part in respect to third persons was to be
deemed that of the i1fant's.

This is plainly a pure dicttm,

yet in siusequent decisions it has been cited with approval.
Some later cases, however, are often cited as following it in
all its harshness, which, upon examination, are found to be
foreign ta this phase of our-question.(a)

It was said in

Hartfield v Roper that it was negligence on the part of parents "to allow' a child of such tender years to go into the
pulic highway unattended.
to such a stringent rule.

No subsequent case has adhered
For Mangum v Railway Co.(b) qual-

ifies the language further by saying that it is negligence
"knowingly to allow" a child of tender years to go into a
ulic

stzeet unattened.

Appeals (c)

This case qent to the Court of

and met a reversal of the nonsuit below on the

ground that the wurt ought not to have held, as a matter of
law, that the parents were guilty of negligence because the
plaintiff, a child between three and four years of age,had
escaped from the house through an open window coming within
four feet of the ground, and forming his only means of egress.
(a) Kreig v Wells, 1 E.D.Smith 74.
Lehman v Brooklyn, 29 Barb. 234.
(b) S6 Barb. 230.

(c) 58 N.Y.455.

It was held as a mattor of law that such a child was not sui
juris, and that his parents were only bound to exercise such
care as persons of ordinary prudence exercise in such circumstances, and whether they had done so or not was a question
for the jury.
In Fallon v Railway Co.(a) a child of five years had
been given some milk to drink and was instructed by his mother
to go into the back yard after drinking it.

His mother step-

ped into another room, and the front door being open, the
plaintiff went into the street and was there injured through
defendant's negligence.
his mother left him.

Only five. minutes had elapsed since
Two questions were submitted to the

jury: one as to whet)er the mother was negligent, and the
other as to whether the plaintiff was sul juris.
was a verdict for the plaintiff.

The result

In Mc Garry v Loomis,, (b)

Chief Justice Church said, "the child being in a lawful place,
and exercising what would be regarded as ordinary care ii) an
adult, is entitled to recover for an injury occasioned by the
wrongful act of another, irrespective of the conduct of the
parents".
iainz v Troy (o)' was a case in which a child of five
(a) 64 N.Y. I5.,

(b) 65 N.Y. 108.
(c) 104 N.Y. 344.

years was seriously injured by the falling of a counter placed
in a !negligent condition in the street.

The doctrine laid

down by the court was that a defendent cannot defeat a recovery for an injury to a child not sui juris causes by defendent' negligence, by simply showing that the acts of the
ehild were such as would be deemed a contributing cause in

an

adultj but he, in order to make his defense complete, must go
further,

and show that there was, concurring negligence on the

part of the parents or guardians.

A very late ease before

the same court confirms this doetrine.(a)
We may saytherefore, that the principles to be drawn
from all these cases are, that if the parent's negligence does
not appear beyond rational controversy and reasonable men.
might draw opposite inferences in regard to the fact of negligence from the evidence submitted, then there arises a
question of fact for the jury; Vhat the plaintiff makes out a
prima facie case by showing that the parents were watchful of
the child to a certain degree,- not an extraordinary, but a
reasonable degree; that the child escaped from their control
and was injured by the negligence of the defendant.

The

burden of proof then shifts to. the defendant and he must show,
(a)

luerzeler v Railway Co.,

1ZO N.Y.

49.

(1) that the acts of the child were such as would bar an
actian if brought by an adult and (2) , that the parents were
negligent in allowing him to be in a place of danger.

If

the defendent fails to establish these two conditions, his
defense falls.

It seems that the cases will warrant the

conclusion that, a child of four years or under is, as a matter of law, non sui juris, but when there is any doubt as to
the capacity of a child over that age, and below the age where
the courts would, as a matter of law, declare him sui juris,
then the jury must determine the question.
Other States have substantially adopted the New York
rule, among the most noted of whicb is Massachusetts.

One

of the earliest cases was Callahan v Bean (a), the facts being
almost the same as those in a New York case of Igc Clain v
Van Zandt (b), and the rulings of the respective courts were
essentially the same.

The facts of the Massachusetts case

were that the father having taken the plaintiff a child of
two years of age across the street, bought him some candy,
and after looking up and down the street and seeing no carriage or danger directed the child to return home, and the
father then went bacX into the store.
(a) 9, Allen 401.
(b) 48 How. Pr. Rep.

80.

The street was only

eighteen feet wide, and the child within two minutes was
negligently run over by defendant's carriage.

The court

held that such a state of facts showed a want of due care an
the part of the father, and therefore, that there was no question for the jury.

While in the case of Me Geary v Ry.aa.

where a child of eighteen months was placed in ( ehair

.Il.

the mother proceeded to wash the floor, and havig.,her baed
turned for two minutes, the child escaped through the open
door to defendant's railroad track thirty feet distant, and
was there negligently injured, the lower court ruled that the
evidence did not show sufficient care on the part of the
mother,
case

and having directed for the defendant reported the

to the Supreme. Court where it was held, that whether

the mother had exercised proper care or not was a question of
fact for the jury.
We can, therefore, see from these cases that the New
York and Massachusetts courts draw a distinction between those
cases where the child escapes fraw

the guardian's care, and

those in which the guardian has directed the child to go,
alone or cannot excuse
ing the child.
(a

l55 Mass.

;or

justify his failure in

not watch-

In those cases coming under the first disS6S.

tinctian any evidence showing that proper care was taken under
the cirumistances, will justify the court in submitting the
question to the jury.

But in th6se cases coming under our

second distinction, the cw-urt will refuse to submit the question to the jury,and rule as a matter of law in favor of the
defendant.

It

seems also that a child non sut ju:is

un-

attended in a public street, and there injured by defendant's
negligence is prima facie evidence of two things, (1) that
his guardians were negligent and,()
jeontributed to his injury.

that their negligence

But such facts being only prizm

facie evidence, can be overcome by the plaintiff showing that
although the child was nan sul juris, yet he neither omitted
nor committed any act which would be deemed negligent inan
adult.(a)'

Upon such- a showing,

the prior negligence of the

guardian, and its contributing cause irmediately fade away.
A few other States follow the New York rule,(b),and a few more
rather favor it, yet it cannQt be said that they are committed
to it

(a)

entirely.(c)

Gibbons v Williams

135 Mass. 335

Lynch v Smith,104 Ib.52

Op) Railway Co. v Huffman,28 Ind. 287; Obrien v 'c Glinehy,
68 Me. 552; Fitzgerald v Railway Go., 29 Minn. 336.
(al Meeks v Railway Co.,53 Cal. '51a; Railway Co. v Smith, 25

Kan. 742; Me Mahon v Railway Co.,
Railway Co.,6l Wis. 557.

39 Id. 430

loppe v

But the great weight of authority,

and it

seoems to me

with boettor reason, repudiates the whole doctrine of imputing negligence to a child non sui juris.

The parent case

arrayed on this side is Rebinsene v Cone (a) .

The plain-

tiff in the actien was at the time of the injury only thred
years and nine months old.
and after its

lie had Ieen attending school,

dismissal was amusing himself by sliding down a

kill en his sled.

While thus engaged, he was run ever by

dafendqnt's tear and injured.

The jury found that the do-

fendont eeuld by proper care, have aveided the accident.
Judge Redfield in deciding the case reviewed the doctrine of
Davis v Mann with approval, and also placed this case within
the principle of those where persons, although trespassing
and are injured by concealed traps, guns ete. are allowed to
recever danagis from the owner.

The Judge said, " and we

are not satisfied, that although a child, or idiot, or lunatie, may, to seme extent, have escaped into the highway
through the fault or negligence

of his keeper, and so be im-

properly there, yet if he is hurt by the negligence of the
defendant,

he is

net precludeud from his redress

".

The re-

asoning of 11artfield v Repor was disapproved as being unsatis(a)

2

Vermont

13.

factory both in

reason and justice.

The next and perhaps the best reasoned case on this sifde
of the question is

Railwray Co.

v Snyder.(a)

The court re-

fused to adopt the New York doctrine in any form, because the
reasons which bar an action by an adult when his own negligence contributes, are, in the case of a child, wholly wanting.

The court said,

"

can it

le

truze,

and is such *s the

law, that if only one party offends against the infant he has
his action, but if

two offend against him, there faults neu-

each otheSr amd he has no remedy ?'

tralize

His right is

to

have an action against both.".
This,

it

seems to rie,

is

unanswerale.

An infamt ean-

,

not be deprived of his property by any wrong comnitted 'by his
parents.

In our introduction we pointed out as one of the

essential elements.that, the third person's or guardian's
negligence must be the p'roximate eause of the child's injury
in order to prevent a recovery by the child.

Clearly that

is so, for how could the child sue the defendant for a wrong
eommitted boy another ?

Now, if a ehild being non sui juris

is allowed to be in the street, and is there injured by a defendeat who might, by the exercise of reasonabole diligence
(a1 18 Ohio State 400.

under the circumstances, have avoided the injury, why cannot
the child recover ?
him to be in

Is the parent's negligonce in allowing

the street the proxinate cause of his injury ?

Not at all.

The most that we can say is that it was a re-

mote cause.

Therefore, we see that one of the requisite

elements is

entirely absent,

and that the New York courts to-

gether with its converts, avoid this Iy a fiction of law.

It

is not claimed that even though the parents are, or are not
negligent in allowing him to be in a place of danger and there
receive injury that he can recoter.
'been negligent,
look into all.the

The defendant must have

and to determine this, it
circizastances,

is

necessary to

the age of the child; and the

power of the defendant to have prevented the injury.

Axd

from the fact that the class of persons now under consideration are incapable of judgment and discretion in the eyes
of the law, it is inctiutent upon all persons to act with a
greater degree of care to avoid injuring them, than would
otherwise be required wore such persons not under a disatility
The test in

our introduction for irnputing negligence re-

quires either the legal relation of master and servant,

or of

principal and agent between the child and his p.arents.

Is

the child his parent's i.aster ?

He nay be in fact,

but

certainly not in law.
parent his agent ?
trine is,therefore,
fiction.

Is

he his parent's yrtncipal,

Most assuredly not.

and the

The New York doe-

fcunded upon a dictiva and supported by a

The length of this paper will not permit a further

discussion of the cases on this side, and it will therefore be
sufficient to cite the additional authority supporting it.
It

may be proper to state that sonme courts in

(a)

determining tke

ehild's capacity have adopted the same rules as

are applied

im determining his criminal capacity under tihe common law. (b)
Section 2.

Attendea.

Having discussed the phase of

our question in whioh the child is unattended by any person
of discretion, we will next turn our attention to another
pbase,to wit, whtere the child is attended, and see if tke legal principles which govera are,

in

any reepect,

differext.

(a), Daley v Railway Co., 2G Conn. 591; Wymore v IMohaska County
79 Iowa 396.; Railway Co. v Wilcox, 133 Ill. 370; Westervelt v Levi Bros.,43 La. 63; Westbrook v Railway Co.,G3
Miss.560; Shippy vVillage, 85 Mich. 230; Winters v Railway Co.,99 1"o. 509; - Huff v Aziy, 16 Neb. 139; Bottoms v
Railway Co., 19 S.E. (S.C. ),7O; Bisaillon v Blood, 64 N.H.
565; Railway Co. v Schuster, 113 Pa. St. 412;
Whirley v
Whiteman, 1 1lcad.Ten. )610;
Railway Co. v Moore, 59 Tex.
64; Railway Co. v Ormsby, 27 Gratton ('Va. ) 455;
Mloore v
Railray Co., 2 Mackey ('D.C. ) 437.
(b Coal Co. v Brawley, 83 Ala. 371. aa C pet?
e.

The first case to Which we will diroet our consideration
is Wymoru v Mohaska County (a) .

This was a suit by am ad-

ministrator in behalf of the estate of th

decedent, a child

Of two years of age who, while riding with Iis father in a
wagon was killed by the falling in of a boridge which they
were attempting to aroIs.

The defendat was negligent, but

met up as a defense the imputable contributory negligence of
the fatker.

The court uses the following language,

"

some

vanthorities seem to make a distinction between oases where
the eoxtributory negligence of the parent occurs while he
has the ekild under his imuediate control, and other eases
which oecu- when the child is away from the parent;

but we

°are of the opinion that there is no suffiaient ground for the
distinetion elaimed.

The authority of the parent does not

depend upon the proximity of tke child."
Just what the Judge meant by saying that there can be no
distinction will subsequently 1be considered.

TWo Missouri

eases furnishperhaps, the best illustration of the distinction.

The first being Stillson v Railway Co.(b), where a

child of eight years being in the inraediate presence of her
father was, 1by his direetion, attempting to pass through an

(a) 79 Iowa 39C.
(

67 Missouri (71.

aperture btween two cars when the cars suddenly came together
inflicting the injury.
a recovery,

The court refused to allow the child

because the father being Iresent and directing

the child to stterapt such a dangerous act was,
proximate cause of the plaintiff's

injury.

in

effect,

the

While in Winters

v Railway Co.,(a). where the plaintiff was attended by a girl
ben years old, the court refused to hold that a girl of such
tender years could be such a guardian as was capable by her
acts of being a proximate cause of the child's injury.
other words,

In

the case was treated as though the child was uin-

accorqpanied by anyone.
The solution of the distinction brought out in

these

cases can best be determined by a resort to the test adopted
in our introduction,
third

one of the elements of whicl1

was,

the

~erson or guardian's negligence must be the Troximate

eause in order to bar the plaintiff.

Applying this test to

tke Missouri case first cited, the correctness of the court's
ruling is at oxce made manifest.

How could the child recover

from the defendeaat for-an injury brought on by the active
negligent conduct of its father ?
Imate cause of the child's injury.

(a) 9, Missouri 509.

His acts were the proxReasonabtle care ox.his

part would have prevented it.

Therefore, it was impossible

for the Missourl court to have decided otherwise.

To deter-

mine in all eases whether the guardians negligence or that of
the defendeit's is

the proximate cause ray become a very

difficult question.

But if the guardian being present is

active, and not merely passive, or is passive when he ought
to be active and injury results to the ehild, then even
though the defendex.t has bon negligent, a very strong case
would have to be made out to warrant a recovery by the plaintiff.(a)

The Iowa Judge in the case before him was undoubt-

edly correct in saying that there was no reason to juitify the
drawing of a dis~ination between the ease where the parent
is present, and one in which he is absent.

Most assuredly

the ease under his consideration would warrant no sheh distinction.

Nothing in the case showed that the father act-

ively brought on the injury.

The beridge was built for the

express purppse for which the father was attempting to use it,
and nothing was shown that he knew its

defects,

or ought to

have 'been active in finding them out.
Holly v Gas Co..(supra) illustrates in a striking the
point, where the parent being present remained passive when

(a)

Holly v Gas Co., S.Gray 125.
Waite v Railway Co., 90 Eng. C.L. 728.

ordinary prudenee would have spurred him into action.
To summarize,
guardian is

it

seems that if

the parent or

-present he must neither do what ordinary prudexee

would forboid,
dietate.

thereforo,

nor neglect.to do what a like prudence would

If he fails in either,

edy against the defexdynt,

the child will have no rem-

unless he is

ale

to make so stroxg

a ease as to bring it within the realm of willful injury.

CHAPTER II. INJURIES TO PASSENGERS IN PUBLIC CARRIAGES.
--- ooo---

Section 1.

The Early English Rule of Thorogood v Bryan.

If there is any rule or doetrine which is familiar to
the legal profession it is that growing out of the ease of
Thorogood v Bryax.(a)

The facts were, in brief as follows,

the husband of the plaintiff (whose administratrix she was))
was a passengor in an omnibui, and upox arriving at the point
of destination, the decedent did not wait for the bus to draw
up to thke! 'eurb, 'ut alighlte'd' rhild tho bus was in motion., and
at s

dit

and the curb.

as to allow a carriage to come setweer it
The defendant driving up at this time with

his bus ran over the decedent inflicting the injuries which
resulted in his death.
The case was first tried before a jury, and the judge in
eharging them said, " if they should be of the opiniom that
the oeaurrexce was purely accidental, or that the deceased,
or the driver of the omnibus by which he was carried, had by
any negligence or want of care on their part contributed to
the accident they rpst find for the defendext

".

The verdict

was for the defendeant, and when the case came before the Court

(a) ff Man. G. & S. 115.

of Common Pleas,

the judges assumed that from the charge

above given the jury must have found the driver negligent.
The court in ruling against the plaintiff based its decision
that, " the deceased must be considered as identified with
the driver of the omnibus in which he voluntarily becane a
passexger, and that the negligence of the driver was the negligexce of the deceased

".

Not a single authority was cited, but the court, after
great effort, based the novel doctrine on a dictum foumd in
Bridge v Railway Co. a)

That the passenger had no control

over the driver was suggested in behalf of the plaintiff,
"but must not have 'een
oonsidered it

in

strenuously argued.

The eourt,

however

the opinion lout denied its force ox the

ground that the passenger selected the driver,

and VLkere'y

entered into a contract with him, and that if there was a
breach of' the carriage eontract, the passenger's remedy was
agaixst the driver.

The court argued that as the driver

eould not have ax action against the defendent, that it would
be a monstrous doctrine which would place his passenger in any
better position.

The court, too was influenced, no doubst,

'by the fact that all such suits had been prosecuted against
fa) 3 M.-& W. 244.

the rival instead of against the, carrier of the plaintiff,
and therefore thought that the rule enumciated would be in
'better coxformity to a solund and juist policy of the law.

Oly

one other English case is found approving this rule (a).
Bit whatever reasons the case was

based upon, and what-

ever was sought to 1be achieved by its decision have alike, as
will hereafter be seen, utterly failed, 'because in the first
place the rule was wholly without reason, and in the second
a sound policy could not possible
devoid of

grow out of anything so

reasox;I bot rather discord and confusion would "e

the Idgical result.2
Section 2.

The Present Enrlish Rule.

Still the case

of Thorogood v Bryan stood for nearly forty years recorded in
/

the English reports as forning a part of 'law of the land',
and as answering in the affirmative the great and important

question, Is a passenger while riding in a public carriage,
and there injured by the concxrrent negligence of the driver
and a third person, without a remedy against such third person ?

But during those four decades it did not by any means,

escape the criticism which it

so justly rierited.

Not only

English judges of high athority were stoutly opposed to it,
,(a) Armstrong v Railway Co., 10 Law R. Exch. 47.

lout some of the leading text writers as well.(a)

And in a

case known as the Milan (), which was tried in an Admiralty
Court in 1S30,

Dr Lushington openly refused to bae 'sound by

it, 1st "tbecause it was only a single case: 2nd

-because it

was douIbted ley high authority; 3rd because it was impossible
to reeoncile it with the plain principles of the common law."
Thus it is seen that all along the line strong doubts
were frequently cast upon it.

Finally in 1887 the great

case known as tke Bernina (c), arose, the facts of which were
that two British ships,Bernina and Bushire eamie into a eollisiox througl
vessels.

the coneurrent negligence of the crews of bpotk

An engineer of the Bushire, bout who was not then

on duty, and a passexger of the same vessel were booth drowned.
Aetion was brought in their behalf.

The case was tried i

a

Court of Admiralty 'but, under Lord Campbaell's Act, was really
a comnon law action.

It resulted in a verdict for the do-

femdemt on the authority of Thorogood v Bryan.

The plaintiff

attacked the soundness of the doctrine which had been so unmercifully criticised both in

England and Atierica,

and sue-

eeeded in earrying his case to the Court of Appeals where
(a) Remark of Vaughan Williams, Judge in Tuff v Warman, 2 C.B.
(N.S.) 740;
Smith's Loading Cases Vol. 1 page 220.
(-) Lush. 383.
Ref *-4
'
(re)'. 1-t Pro.Div. 56 jN.C. b7,A

after ax exhaustive exnination into Thorogood v Bryan, its
reasoning; the authority or rathor the lack of authority on
whiek it was based;the cases which had attempted to follow
and those which had condemned it,

a unanimous court eane to

tke just, reasonasle,and long-looked-for conclusion that
Torogoad v Bryax was without reasox oe principle to baek it,
and that it was high time for the court to pronounce upon it
tho inevitable decree of being no longer the law.

Lord Esher,

M.R. who wrote the main opinion used the following language,
" We eanot see any principle on which it can be supported
and that the prepomderence of judicial and professional opixion in Maglamd is against it, and that-the weight of judicial
opixion in-America is also against it.

We are of opinion

that the proposition maintained in it is essentially unjust
axd ineonsistent with othcr recognized propositions of law ".
By a resort to the test adopted in the introduction of
this paper, to wit, that theo legal relation between the
plaintiff and a third person must be either that of master and
servant, or of principal and agent in order that a defendqnt
may effectually bar the plaintiff in such cases, it beeomes
at once apparent that neither the relation of master.axd servant nor of principal and agent existed between the passenger

and the driver of the bus.

If the driver became his agents

the passenger would, as a natural result, be liable for all
dammges negligently done by such driver while the relation
lasted.

The argument that the relation of master and ser-

vant existed shows the fallacy of the rule.

For where sueh

relation exists the master can say to one "eome" and he cometh", and to another "go and he goeth".

Tested by this,

the passeiager was not master, for ten, twenty, thirty or
asy number of drivers could have beer, thrust upon him during
the transit even against his express disapproval.

No one

can say that a master legally occupied sueh a subordinate
position.

To so conteind would place the servant above his

master which, iin faet, is not the law.
Section Z.

The General Do-etrine in the United States.

In the two preceding divisions of this subjeet we have
traced the rise and fall'of the doetrine of Thorogood v Bryan
in Eaglamd,- the home of its origin.

It is the provinee of

this division to treat the doetrine as it exists bn the Uited

States.

The courts of tkis country are, and always have

been striving to keep abreast with the onward and upward movement of an enlightened jurisprudence.

It is a remarkable

faet aid one which eannot but fail to enlist our admiration

that only the courts of one State ever adoptod the doctrine
as applied to this phase of the question.

The courts were

those of Peausylvania, bIut in doing so they.did not accept
the reason of

1'idontification"

as given by the English Courtsl

but based their decision upon the ground that, to restrict
the plaintiff to an action against his carrier only was more
in accord with a sound policy of the law, in that by holding
the carrier alone responsible a greater incentive to care and
diligence would tkus be brought to bear upon him.(a)

This

reason seem.s to be as illogical as the English rule was fallaeious.

No policy of the law is, or can be soymd whieh

will say to one of two joint tort feasors, J.i will protect
you against your wrong doing in order to secure greater care
and circumspection on the part of yonr fellow wrong doer".
The courts properly refuse to enforce any contrilbution
whatever between joint tort feasors.

That being so,

is

there any sufficient reason in law or its policy which will
warrant a court in

saying to a plaintiff

when injured by the

concurrent negligence of his carrier and a third person,

'you

are limited to your carrier only for the enforconent of your
rights ?.-

Certainly not.

The law should, in this class of

(a) Lockhart v Lichtenthaler, 40 Pa. St.
Railway Co. v Boyer, 97 Pa. St. 91.

151.

eases as in others, allow the injured party to proceed at his
eleetion, against either or 'both of the wrong doers.(a)
Thanks to that noble characteristic of mind which is
always open to eonviction and ever ready to learn the truth.
This manifested itself in a case coming before the court of
Pemsylvania in 1882, just two years aftor the overruling of
Tkorogood v Bryan in England.(bs)

The case arose out of an

ixjury to t1e plaintiff while riding in a private carriage.
The, court had repeatedly refused to apply the Thorogood v
Bryan rule in such cases, and therefore it is plain that the
question now under consideration was not involved.

Judge

Clark, however, in writing the opinion and upon whose mind
light had new dawned, could not withstand the temiptatiox of
He aecordingly fired strong shots of dis-

sheddixg it forth.

approval at the rule as laid down in the Loekhart and Boyer
cases.

This was,

of course,

other words a dietum.
greater significance.

only his ptIvate opinion,- in

But the legal profession saw in

it a

It was to theii xot only a ray of light

looming aboove the clouded korizen of the past,
lbright forerunner of a more perfect dawn.

but was a

The next year a

case arose which fully m-et the anticipations of the profession.(O)
(a), Polloca on Torts page 151.
(b) Dean v Railway Co.,129 Pa. St. 514.
(e) Bmting v Hogsett, 139 Pa. St. 363.

The plaintiff,

while riding in

a comrion carriage,

was injured

through the conciurrent negligence of his carrier and the defeadet,

Judge Clark delivered the opinion of the court in

whieh he reiterated his pGrivate opinion given in the Dean
case to the effect that,

"

Where a person suffers injury from

the joint negligence of two parties, they are liable jointly
amd severally, and it would seem in principle a matter of no
coxsequence that one of them is a common carrier ".

The

opinion received the unanimous opl~roval of the court.
it is

Thus

seen that the Pennsylvania courts broke away from tke

rule of Thorogood v Bryan at the first opportunity.
It was stated at the opening of this divisiox that no
other courts in the United State6 ever adopted the rule, yet
very many of them have beek called upon to settle
eontroversies.(a)

it

in

actual

The New York courts, for Iiastance as early

as 1859 in the case of Chapman v Railway Co.,(b) were called
(a) Webster v Railway Co., S3 N.Y. 260;

Railway Co. v Hurrell

(1894) 58 Ark. 454; Railway Co. v Hughes, 87 Ala. 610;
Tompkins v Railway Co., 03 Cal. 1G3; Railway Co. v Markins

88 Ga.

0; Turnpike Co.

Flaherty v RailWay Co.,

102 Mo. 544;

v Stewart,

2 Met.(Ky.) 119;

39 11Mnn.

1238; Beeke v Railway Co.

Cuddy v Horn,

Shacklett, 104 Ill. 364;

46 Mich. 59G; Railway Co. v

Raxdolph v Riorden, 155 Mass.351

Transfer Co. v Kelly, 30 Ohio St. 8.; Larkhan v Navigation Co. II S.W.(Tex.), 131. Railway Co v Administrator
9 S.E.(Va.) 321.
(B)! 19 N.Y. 341.

upon to decide the questicn.
The plaintiff in the action,
while riding as a passenger on the harlem Railway, was in-

Jured through a negligent collission of its train with one
1belonging to.the defendelnt.

Chief Justice Johnson delivered

the opinion of the court,and the reasons given by him for
deelding that the negligence of the carrier would not effect
the plaintiff's right to recover, are so clear aid cover all
Buch

cases

go

fully, that it seems not only justifyable but

bIghly proper to quote them.

" It is entirely plain "1, says

he, "that the plaintiff hpd no control, no management, no advisory power over the train in which he was riding.
trilbute to him,

To at-

therefore the negligence of the agents of the

eompany, and thus bar him of a right of recovery, is baot applying any existing exception to the rule of law, but is formirg a new exception which does not in fact rest upon the original exception, and is based on fiction, and .ineonristent
with justice ".
The general rule of law is, of course, that a plaintiff
has his action for injuries caused through the negligence of
another.

The plain exception to the above rule is that he

eannot have an action if his negligence contributed to his
injlury.

This is the exception rean

by the learned Judge in

saying,

" it

is

not applying any existing exception",

he attempteri one is

but that

now and resting wholly upon fictional

grounds.
The, constant struggle on the paft of those wishing to
adopt the rule was to bring it
mentioned.

within thke real exception abeove

This they sought to accomplish by making the
But Judge Johnson

earrier the plaintiff's agent or s~rvaxt.

sounded the Xey-note which at once revealed the lack of harmany in

such reasoning by saying that,

the plaintiff had no

"

control, no management nor advisory power over the train or
its servants "t.

Control or the right to do so are the powerg

we look for in a principal or master, and no just law can
possibly see such powers vested in

every person riding in

a

eommon carriage,inless it peers through a glass of flatioz.
Baron Pollock took the fictional phrase, 'A identified
with the carriage" to mean that, the plaintiff for the purpose of the action, mist be taken to be in
as the owner of the omniibus or his driver

the sane position
".

But wy put

him in the same position as the owner of' the bus ?

This

question applies with equal relevancy to the passengers on
the railway train or in any other public carriage.
swer to the question is

that,

it

The an-

can only be done by consider-

ing the driver or owner of the bus,

or the operators of the

train as the servant or servants of the passenger.
question at once presents itself.
such relationship be based ?

Axother

Upon what grounds car,

Only by finding that the pas-

senger controls or has the right to control the conduct of
the driver or agents of the train.

But by raerely taking

passage in a commnon carrier, and not directing its movements
further than to point out the different places of destinatiox,
or the general route of travel, will not render a passenger
the master and the operators of the carrier his servants. (a)
Not only have the

numerous State courts decided against

the adoption of the rule of Thorogood v Bryan,, but the Supreme
Court of the United States in
follow the rule. (b)
the eourt and,

a unanimous opinion refuced to

Judge Field delivered the opinion of

after saying that all the English as well as

nimerous cases in the United States show that the relation of
master and servant does not exist said, " In the abasence of
this relation, the imputation of his negligence to the passenger where no fault of onission or cormission is
to him,

is

against all legal rules

?P.

(a) Bennett v Railway Co., '3 N.J.L. 225.
(b) Little
v Iiackett,
110 U.S. 3-6E.

chargeable

It ray,. thoreforo, bc. said without fear of contradiction that, so far as England and the United States are now
concerned, the rule of Thorogood v Bryan as applied to. this
phase of our question is nothing more than one of the sad
mistakes of the past.

And upon first thought, it may seem

to some that too much time and space have been given to its
consideration;

But in this we cannot agree because although

the rule has, in this connection, been swept away by the
courts yet it has been transferred from the -passenger in the
public carriage to that of the passenger in the private carriage, and is there applied in all its harshness.

To this

phase we shall now turn our attention, and trust that we may
t~here Iproceed upon a safer footing by reason of having traversed more fully the backgroimd of this field of investigation.

CHAPTER III. INJURIES TO PASSENGERS IN PRIVATE CARRIAGES.
--- ooo--Seetion 1.,
with a Stranger.

Where the Plaintiff is InJured while Riding
That the rule of Thorogood v Bryan ever

found its way into our lawt-is, indeed, very unfortunate for
it has lead the courts into great confusion, and has in its
operation, worked great injustice to coMplaining litigants.
One wauld naturally expect that the courts of the United State
having refused so strenuously to enforce the rule against a
passenger in a public carriage would, for the same reason,
refuse to enforce it against a voluntary passenger in a private carriage.
-n

m

-

But such uniforitity is not to be found. 7

-

Wisconsin is, perhaps, the pioneer in this direction,

for in the ease of Prideaux v City (a), where action was
brcught to recover damages for an injury sustained while rid-

ing 'by invitation with a friend in his private,carriage, the
driver and City loth being negligent; Uut no personal negligence on the part of the plaintiff -eing

shown, yet the court

held that the driver's negligence was imputable to her, beeause she reposed a trust in him, and that from such trust
reposed the law would raise an irplied agency.

" Voluntary

entrance into a private conveyance "',says the court,
(8).*- -4'

Wisconsin 513.

"

adopts

the conveyance for the time being

Ps

ores own, and assumes

the risk of the skill and care of tho person guiding it .....
There is a personal trust in such case, which implies an
agency ".

The court draws the distinction betwoen the rule

applied to passengers in public carriages and the one applied
to cases of this character by the fact that persons enter
common carriers more from moral neeessity, while persons
enter a private carriage voluntarily and trust to its "eing
safe.
In order to see more fully tho reasons upon which this
novel decision was lased, a further quotation will be useful.
"

It appears absurd,

"

says the court, " to hold that one

voluntarily choosing to ride in a private conveyance, trusts
to the sufficiency of the highway, to the care and skill exercised bey all other vehicles upon it, to the care and skill
governing trains at railway crossings, to the care and skill
of everything except that which is most immediately important
to himself; and trusts nothing to the sufficiency of the very
vehicle in which he voluntarily travels, nothing to the care
and skill of the person in charge of it.

His voliuntary en-

trance is an act of faith in the driver; Iy implication of
law, accepts the driver as his agent to drive him

".

The court, it

seems to me, was correct in

saying that it

would be an abasrdity to hold that the passenger trusted tothe care and skill of all the eniuLerations given; and not- to
hold that he trusted to the care and skill of the driver with
whom he chose to ride.

court failed)

,

But, (and here.it seems to me the

does it follow as a logical conelusion that

by reason of the trust thug reposed,
became the passengerm's agent ,?

that the driver thereby

Not at all.

The driver was

no more her agent, than was the defendqnt dity, or the flagman at the railway arossing. f, She reposed a trust in all of
thega, but only to the extent that they would use due care so
as to avoid injuring her.

This trust reposed that every in-

dividual will use proper care so as to avoid injuring his
fellow men,

is

one which every person has a alear legal right

to exercise without thus rendering the whole of mankind his
t agents,

and thereby s*ijecting him to the effects of all

acts.(a) .

But the court made the driver her agent,

of that mere trust wbich she reposed

ot only in

their

beoause

him, but in

the world at large, 'and that too without showing that she was
aware of his lack or skill in driving, or that she herself
wis

guilty of personal negligence.

(a) See Pollock on Torts page 27g.

,

,

Wisconsin, however, does not stand alone, but has at
least two followers.

The Supreme Court of Montana, in 1304

iii the case of Whitaker v Helexa,(a) held on the rule of the
Prideaux case that the plaixtiff

could not recover damages

for injuries sustained boy being thrown out of-the private
carriage of the driver with Whom he had been invited to ride.
Both the driver and defendent were negligent, bout no personal
negligence whatever was proven against the plaintiff.

That the courts of MontRna should adopt such a rule Is
not so surprising, bsut to see the courts of Michigan do so,
and that too on a misconceived groinmd is, to say the least,
uareasonable.

Tlewcase before tJe Michigan court was Mullen

v OaWsuo, (*). and arose out of the following facts, a woman
of discretion was riding by invitation in a pVivate carriage,
and while thus engaged was injured through the negligence ofthe defendant and the driver.

She was entirely free from

personal legligence, yet the court held upon the authority of
Railway Co. v Miller (e) that the driver's negligence would,
1*y i nutation, prevent her recovery.

The parties in the

Miller ease were similarly situated to those in the Mullen
case; but the plaintiff was shown to have boeen guilty of even
(ay 35 Pao.

Rep. 904.

(c) 25 Micah. 274.

gross negligence.

Therefore, plthough the Prideaux case was

referred to by way of argunment, it is clear that it did not
form the basis of the Miller decision.

This fact was urgent-

ly pressed upon the court in the 7.Zul in ease by a dissenting
opinion, in which, the Chiof Justice concurred.

The .;.ull1n

case was thus establishod by three judges for, and two judges
against it, and if it is to stand it can only do so upon the
ground of the Prideaux case.
This trio of courts stand alone, and opposed to the
of &utko '-t

great weight.

If, however, a blind person for example,onters

A

a private carriage, and confides himself to the care and koping of the driver, the relationship of prineipal and agent is
at once established, and the rights and liabilities of such
relationship at once arise.(a)
It was thought for along time that the Iowa courts were
eommitted to what may be called the

Wisconsint ruld, but the

ease supposed to be thus decided was to the effect that, if
two or more persons are engaged in a

oron enterprise, and

one be injured by the joint negligence of one of his associates and a tkird person, the negligence of skch associate
will be imputed ti him and bar a recovery against the third

(a) Johnson v Railway Co., 21 S.W. (Tez.) 274.

person.(a)

This was plJaced upon the ground that as they

were engaged in a cornmein enterprise ur purpose, each should
be responsible in some degree for the acts of the others.
But the Iowa courts have exprosslk considered the question
that is

now before us in

The plaintif

was riding by invitation in 'the private carriage

of a person,
gence.

the case of Nisbit v Garner (b).

and there injured through the defendant's negli-

The lower court instructed that the negligence of

the driver was imputable to the plaintiff.

The Supreme Court

upon a review of this instruction svid, "The relation of principal and agent must exist in fect.

The law will not create

or presume the relation from the mere fact that he accepted
the invitation of another to ride in his carriage.

If ho is

but the guest of the other, and neither has nor assumes the
right to direct or control tke conduct of the driver, neither
the driver nor owner can be regarded as his servant."
In

Robinson v Railway Co.,(a) the Now York court speak-

ing by C1tief Justice Church could see no reason of law which
would impute the negligence of the driver in

this class of

cases unless the passenger was negligent; or was a master or
prineipaljor unless they were engaged in
(a)
(b)
(a)

Payne v Railway Co.,3O0 Iowa 32.
1 L.R.Ann. 152.
66 N.Y. Ii.

a joint enterprise

in

the sense of mutual responsibility for each others acts.
It was said in P Casa coming before the court of Indiana

that,

"negligonce could bu irn.,uted only in

was unskilful and that
Indiana

court,

case the driver

the passenger knew of it".(a)

The

no doubt, dicided the cast, in accordance with

the great weight of authority but like miany other courts, was
somewhat careless in

t1v use of the term 'imputed'.

The case

put by the Indiana court seems to me to be exactly the one in
w1ich imputed negligence does not arise.

If

the passenger

rides with an unskilful driver, and does so knowing of his
lack of skill, the question of imputed negligence does not
enter into the case, because he by his very act and knowledge
has barred himself from recovering from the negligent defendetnt, not by reason of the driver's negligence
certain circum..stances imputed),
tributory negligence.

whieh is, under

but by reason of his own con-

(b)

It is unnecessary to discaiss any further the cases which
are opposed to the 'Wisconsin rule',

and it will therefore

suffice to simply cite the additional authority opposed to it.Cc)
(a) Commissioners v 1flutchler, 36 1I.E. 534.
(b) Brickell v R.R. Co. 120 N.Y.2O; Pollock on Torts p.584.
(e) R.R.Co. v Powell, 8 Ga.601; Cashillv R.R.Oo.!3 S.W.(Ky.)2
Randolph v Riorden, 155 iass.331 R.R.Co. v Davis,69 1.1iss.
444; Follman v City,.35 1,Minn.522; R.R.Co.v Hogeland, 33 Md.
149; Noyes v Boscawen,54 N.I1.30 I R.R.Co.v Endie,45 Ohio
St.91; Carlisle v Brisbane,ll

F'a.St.544;

Briefly siunmarizing, it seems to me that the 'Wisconsin
rule' is essentially the Thorogood v Bryan doctrine in a
modifiod form and, although the Wisconsin court chose to
eloak it umder the name of an "implied agency" rather than
umder "identification" yet it, no doubt, failed to breathe
tnto it the soul of the law,
principle.

and thereby render it a living

On the other hand it

seems that the rule of the

opposed authority will not imply an agency from the mere faet
that the plaintiff rode in the Irivato earriago, but will require either one of two tkings to be shown, (1) that the
plaintiff controlled the driver or (2) that he had the right
to control kim.

And when the courts speak of imputing the

driver's negligence to the plaintiff when he has knowingly
ridden with a careless or unskilf'ul driver, they mean not,
that the driver's negligence is to be imiuted to the plaintiff, but that the paintiff's own negligence bars his recovery.

His negligence would consist, of course, in riding

with such a driver, with a full Rnowledge of the dangers
which are so likely to follow.
The cases which speak of imputing the negligence of the
driver to his follow associates when engaged in a common purpose etc., do not thereby raise an exceptional rule; but one

w1ieh falls logically within one of the two requirements set
forth- above.

We now turn to a consideration of the last

phase of our subject.
Seation 2.

Where the Plaintiff is

Enjured whileR

The question atO once presents itself,

with her Husband.

What prineiple or reason exists in this phase of our subject
which was not present in the one just considered ?

If noth-

ing more can be fuund than that which the 'Wisconsin rule'
requires,

then in

justice and reason there can be no fouri-

dation for saying that her husband's negligence, contributing
with that of a third person's to hor injury, is imputable to
her so as to bar her action against sueh third person.

There

fore, a searelt for the purpose of ascertaining the reason or
principle upon which an imputation'of negligdnce can thus be
founded is of the greatest importance;.
The Iowa courts, it will be remembered, stood out boldly
against the 'Wisconsin rule'; but here they hold that if

the

wife is injured by te joint negligence of her husband (ke
from their relation being bound to care for and protect ho0),
and a tkird person, his negligence will be imputed to Ier and
bar her redress against the third person.(a)

(a) Yahn v Ottumwa,

80 Iowa 429.

The reason

for the holding was based not upon any ageney; but upon the
marital relation of the parties.

The fact that she was

under the husband's care and that he was boinmd to protect
1ker seemed to form the gist of the reason.
The Vervont courts impute the kusband's negligence to
the wife in

this class of cases, not on the ground of the

marital relation,

as they say; but place it

upon the ground

that the husband is her servant, he having the care and eustody of her person and responsible fmr her safety.(a)
The difference in real substance between the two reasons
given is not very plain.
vant.

Both, it seems, make him her ser-

The civil code of California makes the right ta den-

ages in favor of the wife during marriage as well as the money
recovered, cor~mmrnity property, and tkerefore in cases of this
ekaracter the husband's negligence bars her recovery upon the
plain principle of agency.(b)
The courts of Connecticut are often cited as supporting
the rule which imputes tke negligence of the husband to the
wifei (c) but upon investigating the case, it is at once seen
that what was said in that regard is nothing but a mere 4.ictum, because the.wife was guilty of negligence,

and no negli-

(a) Carlisle v Sheldon, 38 Vt. 440; R.R.Co.v Crittenden, 42
Ill.
App. 4G9.
(b), Me Fadden v R.R.Co.,
7 Cal. 464.
(a) Peek v R.R.Co., 50 Conn. 379.

genee whateVer was proven against the defendont.
The most interesting and instructive case on this side
of the question is one which was tried in the courts of New
The action was brought to recover damages for an

Jersey.(a)

injury to the wife caused by a collission between defendant's
ears and a earriage in which the wife and husband wore riding.
The case was before the Supreme Court for the purpose of reviewing the charge of the trial

judge to the effect that, the

negligenee of the husband could not be imputed to tke wife.
The first

thing wkich the court sought to aceomplish was to

determine tite pesture of the kusband to the suit.
so, it

establised,

(1)

the husband is

doing

tkat tke coimmon law required the kus-

band and wife to join in
tkat if

In

an aetion for her injury;

interested in

and (2)

the subject matter of

the sui*, and through his negligence the action arose, ke
cannot recover; and (3)

tkat if

judgment is

recovered,

the

husband has the right to receive the money.
From the three propositions thus established,

the mourt

reaked the conclusion that the common law would give to the
defemAqnt a complete defense by his showing that the plaintiff's husband assisted to create the cause of action.
(a)Railway Co.

v Goodenough, 22 L.R.Ann. 460

But

tkis did not necessarily determine the controversy for it was
strenuously urged-on tke part of the plaintiff that the statute, giving to tku wife her real and. personal property absolutelykad ekangel the common law.

The court, however, keld

tkat the common law, in tkis connection, remained untbuehed
by the statute because "personal torts do not create rigkts
of property", and that the husband kaving not a mere power to
sue for tke wifeibut a power coupled witk an interest in the
stit, would thereby bar her recovery by reason of his eontributory negligence.
A strong dissent was entered by Judge Dixon based upon
two gre nmds, (l)\that the kusband at common law kal no legal
interest in the cause of action accruing to a married woman
for a tort to her person, and (2) tkat when the action
merged in a jud~gment, such judgment was

beesme

property witkin tke

meaning of the statute, and therefore belonged to
It seems tkat altkough the case involved the

er.,
question

of imputed negligence, yet the decision went off upon the
tkeory that the common law remaining un hanged rendiered( it,
in effect, the husban's action and ruled as a natural result
tkat he could not recover for his own wrong.
Wkile the greater number of states are on the sie'of the

question just *onsidered, yet it seems that the better reason
is

"posed

wife.

to imputing the negligence of the husband to the

The court of Indiana in two well reasoned cases (a)

held that from the mere marital relation, or from the fact
that she

was unler her kusbands control and protection

would not render his negligence kers by imputation$ but in
oder to do so, it was necessary to make it ap)ear that ke was
ker agent.

"I-e" t , says the court,

"should be subject to ker

eentrol and direction.t
In

New York the statute rogarding the property of married

women is substantially the same as that of New Jersey, yet
the court reached the conclusion that the husband's negligence
cannot be izfputed to the wife in this class of cases.

S'he is

however, like all other persons similarly situated, required
to use ordinary care, and whether she has done so or net is a
question of fact for the jury.(b)

The Federal Courts are

also in line with Indiana and New York on tkis question.(C)
There seems to be no justice or consistency in the reason
that because the wife is entitled to the care and protection
of her lnsband that ke should
other words,

thereby be riade her agent.

the solemn vow of care and protection taken by

(a) Railway Co.v Creek, 130 lnd.

139; RlRlCo.v Spilker,154

Ind. 380.
(b) Hoag v Railway Co., 11] N.Y. 190.
(e) Shaw v Craft, (Oio) 37 Fed. 317.

In

kim on thteir wedding day is made the evidonce of his ageney,
and if

he in conjunction with another dare violate it,

whom the law was so anxious to protect and defend,

she,

finds her-

self stripped not only of all protection-, but that the sacred
shield of her marriage imrn has become, under the sanction of
the law, a two-edged sword against her.

Such is, in effect,

the result of the reasoning of the New Jersey court.

CHAPTER IV.

C'ONCLUS IONS, AND WHAT TIIF

LAW 07 OTER STATES MAY BE IN THE FUTU=E.
---

0000---

impute to a child not sui juris the

The courts whichli

negligence of its parents; those which impute to a mere passive guest, in a private carriage, the negligence of the
driver; and those whick impute to a wife the negligence of
her 1 sband w4ile riding with him in

his private carriage,

have drifted away from the pure principles of agency, and
have sought in
upon wkieo

the rcalras of speculation for sane principle
Mile these

to anchor their unfondA doctrines.

eau*ts have tried to bolster up their rules with the prinetples of agencyi yet the real basis is
the partieula

found in

court deeMs to be expedient or in

that wich
aecird with

a sound public policy.
This was,

without doubt,

the true ground upon which

Tartfiold v Roper proceeded, and the Pennsylvania courts, it
will be remembered, frankly acknowledged such to be the gretund
for th-eir early adoption of the rule of Tlorogood v Bryan.
The 'Wisconsin rule'

growing out of the Prideaux case must

also be rested upon the ground of expediency,

for it

was

plainly seen that there existed neither an express nor implied

agency.
Had these courts asked themselves the question, 'Did the
person whom it is endeavored to impute with negligence do the
negligent act through the person whose negligence is sougkt
to be imputed ?,

their answer could not consistently have beer

anytking else but "no"'; and thus a sound public policy would
For all parentsnot only

thereby have been subserved.

the higher

throughout the lower strata of animal life,but in

as well, kave the livine instinct which prompts them to protect
and defend their offspring against danger and peril, an
public policy will, in any

3egreestrengthen such instinet in

humanity by depriwing an injured child of redress,
is

no

tkaught that proper care was rot taken by its

because it

parents for

its protection.
Just wkat true expediency resides in the. 'Wisconsin rule;
wkick imputes to a passenger in a private carriage the negligenee of the driver, wten the passenger neither controls, nor
htas tke right of control over the iriver is, to say the least,
quite diffiult to understand.

If

the person has knowingly

rldien wit.h a careless ani unskilful driver, his own contributory negligence bars hin from redress, and imputed negligenee
is entirely foreign to the case.

But a rule wtich imputes

to a mere passive guest, in a private carriage, the negli-

gence of tke driver does not, it seems, subserve any true
public policy;but overrides the fundamental princi!-Iles of law
and wholly disregards the instinct Og self-preservation.
Whether at the conmon law the negligence of the kusband
can be imputedi t-o the wife, whilo, she is riding with him in
his private carriage so as to bar her action (she being the
meritorious party) against a negligent defendent is, at this
time, an unsettled question, unless it can be said tkat the
New Jersey decision(supra~ has determined it.
Quite a number of States courts have not yet passed upon
tkese questions, but if the immediate past furniskes us any
insight into the future, it is possible that some of them may
follow the 'Wisconsin rule' ; but on the other hand it is
highly probable that it they are asked to apply t1he"New York
Rule"to children not sui juris, there answer with one accord
will be:We will not impute to those helpless ones the fault,
If parents or guardians o'or them no protection raise;
But will stretch forth the law's strong arm,
Their precious rights to save.

